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Locally-based monitoring (LBM) has been pro-
posed as a solution to overcome the costs of 
monitoring the condition and development of 
natural resources and ecosystems in developing 
countries. Based on a recent empirical study 
on LBM, this brief argues that careful attention 
should be paid to the incentives and power 
struggles surrounding the particular context 
within which LBM schemes are based as they 
will invariably shape the information produced 
and communicated.    
What is locally-based monitoring?
We define LBM as the systematic measurement 
of variables over time involving local people in 
some or all stages of the collection, analysis 
and use of data. While often drawing upon 
local ecological knowledge, LBM denotes a 
highly, standardized approach that can be used 
by local people to generate information about 
natural resources in their locality. Depending on 
whether the involvement and training of local 
people goes beyond mere data collection, LBM 
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A forest committee involv-
ed in locally-based moni-
toring in front of their 
office, Tanzania.
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Locally-based monitoring (LBM) signifies the systematic measurement of data on variables 
of relevance to natural resource condition and use over time involving local people in some 
or all stages of the collection, analysis and use of data.  
Careful attention should be paid to the incentives and power struggles surrounding the par-
ticular context within which LBM schemes are based as they will invariably shape the infor-
mation produced and communicated. 
Mechanisms to assure transparency and accountability in LBM schemes are important to 
minimize the risks associated with the use of information produced and communicated  
under them. 
Policy Recommendations
may or may not deliver co-benefits in the form of local em-
powerment and capacity building that are usually associated 
with participatory or local approaches to natural resources 
management.
Why the interest in locally-based monitoring?
In recent decades, locally-based monitoring has been em-
phasized as a useful tool for conservation and sustainable re-
source management. The growing interest has been spurred 
by a realization that the costs of monitoring natural resources 
and ecosystems are prohibitive particularly to developing 
nations. The growing emphasis on participatory approaches 
to natural resources management has furthermore led to 
calls for monitoring schemes that are more relevant to and 
favour the active participation of local people. Considerable 
optimism has been expressed about the usefulness and cost 
effectiveness of LBM schemes in this respect (Danielsen et 
al. 2000, 2005). Proponents envision that by involving lo-
cal people in the systematic gathering of information about 
natural resources and their use, data can be generated to 
support management decisions with particular potential 
where national authorities and local communities collaborate 
on resource management. It is, among others, expected that 
locally-based monitoring information can be used to assess 
whether the terms of management agreements specifying 
rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in collabora-
tive natural resources management are fulfilled (Danielsen et 
al. 2003; Garcia & Lescuyer 2008). 
What is the evidence from this case?
The evidence presented here compares results from a LBM 
system used in 23 Tanzanian villages with forest transect 
surveys of wildlife densities and human disturbance in the 
forests and an audit of financial transactions done by re-
searchers. 
Study area and methods
The study was conducted in Iringa District, Tanzania where a 
LBM system was developed and implemented in 23 villages 
in the Udzungwa Mountains and adjacent woodlands in con-
nection with a collaborative forest management project. The 
LBM was carried out by village natural resource committees 
(VNRCs) that were elected by the villagers and subsequently 
trained in the monitoring procedures by external consultants. 
The LBM encompassed weekly patrols in the surrounding 
forests as well as procedures for summarizing information on 
ecological and resource use indicators, financial transactions, 
and management procedures in so-called monthly reports 
that are sent by the VNRCs to the District Forest Office. Four 
montane and four woodland villages were included in  the 
study. The comparison was based on wildlife densities and 
human disturbances and financial transactions as reported 
in monthly reports by the VNRCs. This was compared with 
information obtained from forest transects surveys and au-
dits of VNRC financial accounts, respectively, over the period 
2003-2008. Interviews and participant observations formed 
the basis of an analysis of underlying reasons for observed 
discrepancies in the comparison.
Montane Woodland
Village data
Population (per village) 1,000 - 2,600 1,600 - 3,000
Distance to Iringa town 45 - 80 km 20 - 60 km
Rainfall (mm/year) 1,500 - 2,000 600 - 900
Growing seasons 2 1
Main agricultural crops Maize, beans, potatoes, 
green peas, various veg-
etables, tea, fruit trees 
Maize, sunflower, beans, 
tobacco, millet, tomato, 
ground nut.
Forest data
Habitat type Montane to upper mon-
tane forest
Dry miombo woodland 
forest
Forest area (ha) 3,700 - 35,000 5,000 - 10,000
Forest elevation (masl) 350 - 2,570 1,200 - 1,600
Standing stock (cum/ha) NA 45 - 70
Main forest uses Bushmeat hunting, pole 
cutting, medicine plant 
collection
Firewood for tobacco 
curing and selling, char-
coal, grazing, timber.
Table 1: Basic characteristics of the eight case study villages.
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Comparing LBM with forest transect surveys
The comparison was done in relation to the four montane 
forests only and with a focus on trends in human disturbance 
levels, as represented by density of hunting traps. The com-
parison in Table 2 shows that the information communicated 
by the VNRCs in monthly reports and their perceptions of 
trends as stated in interviews indicates a decreasing trend 
in density of hunting traps, whereas the transect surveys, in 
three out of four VNRCs, indicate the exact opposite. Accord-
ingly, the information communicated by VNRCs in monthly 
reports and interviews is generally more positive as to the 
effectiveness of the collaborative management than what is 
indicated by the transect surveys.
Comparing LBM with financial audit
Comparison of information on incomes and expenditures re-
ported by VNRCs in monthly reports with an audit of receipts 
and vouchers indicate a considerable level of discrepancies. 
Financial flows tend to be underrepresented in the monthly 
reports (see Figure 1 below). Discrepancies furthermore ap-
pear concentrated in discrete periods that in several cases 
correlate with cases of embezzlement. Most villages had 
experienced one or more examples of financial mismanage-
ment leading to dismissal of VNRC members, and the audit 
revealed that 1-55 % of the total income recorded in receipts 
was unaccounted for in vouchers, cash or bank account bal-
ances. Finally, interviews with resource users, traders in forest 
products, and VNRC members revealed that an unknown 
share of financial transactions and resource uses were not re-
corded in the monitoring system due to evasion of control by 
forest users with and without collusion with VNRC members 
and village leaders.
Underlying reasons for results
Interviews and observations indicate that the production 
and communication of information through the LBM system 
Village Monthly reports VNRC statement Transect survey
Montane 1 ↓ ↓ ↑
Montane 2 ↓ ↓ ↑
Montane 3 ↓ ↓ ↓
Montane 4 0 ↓ ↑
Table 2: Trends in traps as reported in monthly reports; stated 
by VNRCs during interviews; and observed during transect 
surveys. Trend lines based on data reported in monthly reports 
from 2003 to 2008 were derived through linear regression 
of observations per hour patrolled. VNRCs were asked about 
their perceptions of trends during semi-structured interviews. 
Trends observed during transect surveys are based on distance 
sampling on village adjacent transects in 2001 and 2008. 
Here all trends are represented by a symmetric three point 
Likert scale (↑ = increase, → = no change, ↓ = decrease). 
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Figure 1: Average income/expenditure reported in monthly reports less average monthly values recorded in receipts/vouchers for 
the period January 2003 to July 2008 from four montane villages (1-4) and four woodland villages (5-8).  
Settling a con-
flict over grazing 
in a locally ma-
naged forest, 
Tanzania.
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takes place in a context of power struggles over access to 
benefits from collaborative forest management. For many, 
VNRC membership was regarded a lucrative position in terms 
of salaries and allowances as well as access to illicit benefits 
through collusion with resource users and embezzlement. 
The real and perceived oversight by fellow villagers and 
the District Forest Office (that receives the monthly reports) 
implies that individual VNRC members appeared to have 
considerable incentives to report positive trends in ecological 
monitoring data and conceal discrepancies in financial man-
agement by withholding or only presenting one source of 
information. It is thus clear that the monitoring information 
understates the magnitude of financial flows and utilization 
levels – albeit to an unknown extent – implying that the com-
municated information is impaired in relation to assessing 
resource use patterns and ensuring sustainability.
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Preparations for an illegal charcoal kiln discovered during 
forest patrol under a locally-based monitoring scheme,  
Tanzania. 
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Concluding remarks
The results from this case study indicate that information 
produced and communicated under locally-based monitoring 
systems is shaped by incentive structures and power struggles 
in the particular context within which they are embedded. 
Furthermore, the power struggles over access to the resourc-
es and benefits accruing from collaborative forest manage-
ment found in our case study seem to be the norm rather 
than the exception in such processes (for a review, see Ribot 
et al. 2010). Accordingly, we urge policy makers to carefully 
consider the specific incentive structures and power struggles 
surrounding natural resource management when consider-
ing LBM as a means to overcome the costs of monitoring the 
condition and development of natural resources and eco-
systems. Further, we call for attention to mechanisms  
assuring transparency and accountability in the way monitor-
ing information is produced, used and communicated.
To know more about the case study see: Nielsen, M.R. and 
J.F. Lund. 2012. Looking for White Elephants? Production and 
communication of information in a locally-based monitoring 
scheme in Tanzania. Conservation and Society 10(1): 1-14. 
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